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Abstract
An information-theoretic thought experiment is developed to provide a method-
ology for predicting endowment distributions in the absence of information on agent
preferences. The allocation problem is rst presented as a stylised knapsack prob-
lem. Although this knapsack allocation is intractable, the social planner can nev-
ertheless make precise predictions concerning the endowment distribution by using
its information-theoretic structure. By construction these predictions do not rest
on the rationality of agents. It is also shown, however, that the knapsack problem
is equivalent to a congestion game under weak assumptions, which means that the
planner can nevertheless evaluate the optimality of the unobserved allocation.
JEL classication: C02, C62, D51, D83.
Keywords: Information theoretic measure, knapsack problem, congestion game,
potential function.
1 Introduction
Economics is traditionally based on the observation of two central stylised facts. The rst
is the existence of stable economy-wide characteristics, such as stable prices, demands
etc. The second is the existence of systematic behaviour from agents, which broadly
consist of rational and optimal actions with respect to selsh interests. Standard economic
models show that this systematic behaviour of agents can lead to such stable aggregate
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for their suggestions, and is grateful in particular to Jagjit Chadha, Sonia Moulet, Mishael Milakovic,
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characteristics. However, the reverse link is also of interest: Does the observation of stable
aggregate characteristics imply that agents are rational ? In other words, while systematic
agent behaviour might be a sucient condition for stable aggregate characteristics, is it
also necessary one?
The existence of this reverse link was raised in particular by Becker (1962), who shows
that downwards sloping market demands can occur independently of agent rationality,
simply through changes in the opportunity set of agents following changes in prices.
Gode and Sunder (1993) analyse this further and show that market discipline can lead
to ecient outcomes even with zero-intelligence traders that perform no optimisation.
Their conclusion is in fact that \learning, intelligence, or prot motivation is not neces-
sary" (Gode and Sunder, 1993, p134). Finally, the nature of the link between these two
stylised facts is also put into question by the result of Sonnenschein (1972, 1973), Mantel
(1974) and Debreu (1974), as their central theorem shows that \the utility hypothesis
tells us nothing about market demand unless it is augmented by additional requirements"
(Sonnenschein and Shafer, 1992, p672).
The relation between these two stylised facts is investigated using a thought experiment
in which the problem of allocating resources between agents is presented as a variant of
the knapsack problem. This is a well known combinatorial optimisation problem where
one has a set of objects with given values and weights and the objective is to pick the
combinations of objects with the highest value without exceeding xed a weight limit,
i.e. the capacity of the knapsack. The purpose of this thought experiment is to clarify
the sequence of steps required to solve the problem in theory, rather than to provide a
practical solution to allocation problems.
The rst key nding of the thought experiment is that information-theoretic consider-
ations strongly constrain the feasible endowment distribution. The second is that under
standard assumptions on preferences the knapsack allocation problem is equivalent to a
congestion game, a form of game identied by Rosenthal (1973) in which a single po-
tential function encodes changes in payos when agents switch strategies and attains an
extremum for Nash equilibria. Overall, this implies that the endowment distributions
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depend only on the constraints of the knapsack problem while the conditions under which
the knapsack problem is equivalent to a congestion game only relate to the preferences of
agents.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the the knapsack
framework used to model the allocation problem facing a social planner. Section 3 then
uses an information-theoretic methodology to show how the predicted aggregate distribu-
tions depend on the constraints only and how the similarity between knapsack problems
and congestion games depends only on assumptions relating to preferences. Section 4
discusses the implications of these ndings and concludes.
2 A thought experiment: allocation as a knapsack
problem
The allocation problem facing a social planner is modeled using the multichoice multi-
dimensional variant of the knapsack problem (MMKP). Compared to a standard knapsack
problem the MMKP enlarges both the number of choices and constraints, making the
framework more general. In this variant several groups of objects are available, with
each object providing a specic value and requiring distinct resources. The objective is
to pick a single object from each of the groups, maximising their aggregate value while
ensuring the multi-dimensional resource constraint is met.1 The MMKP has already been
used in the operational research literature to model practical allocation problems, for
example allocating nurses with dierent skills and time preferences to dierent types of
shifts (Dowsland and Thompson, 2000), or allocating distinct computing resources such
as memory and CPU cycles to several networked users with dierent session preferences
(Khan, Li, Manning, and Akbar, 2002).
There are N agents in the economy, labeled i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng, and the social planner
has to allocate Q dierent units amongst those agents. Although this does not inuence
1For instance, in the allocation problem each agent is faced with a group of bundles and the optimi-
sation requires picking a single bundle for each agent.
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the general problem, it will be convenient in the discussion to distinguish K types of
commodities, labeled k 2 f1; 2; :::; Kg for which qk 2 N units are available, in which case
Q =
P
k qk. The allocation problem can be solved, in principle with the following four
steps.
 Step 1: The social planner labels all the possible bundles that can be built with
the Q units available and lists them in a 2QQ binary identier table B, shown in
table (1). The binary string formed by each row provides a unique identier for the
bundle as well as the bundle's composition. 2
Table 1: Binary bundle identiers
B j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 ... j = Q
b = 1 0 0 0 0 ... 0
b = 2 1 0 0 0 ... 0
b = 3 0 1 0 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ...
b = 2Q 1 1 1 1 ... 1
 Step 2: The social planner sends the B-table to the N agents who rank the 2Q
bundles according to their preference. The rankings are returned to the social
planner who then builds a 2Q  N ranking table U , shown in table (2). Under
the usual assumptions of transitivity and monotonicity, all agents will rank the full
bundle rst and the empty bundle last.
Table 2: Bundle preference ranking
U i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 ... i = N
b = 1 2Q 2Q 2Q 2Q ... 2Q
b = 2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
b = 2Q 1 1 1 1 ... 1
 Step 3: The social planner must pick a bundle for each agent, using a 2QN choice
matrix X, where the choice variables are Xb;i 2 f0; 1g. Importantly, each agent only
2As a matter of convention, the rst bundle listed is the empty bundle and the last one is the full
bundle.
4
receives a single bundle, i.e.
2QP
b=1
Xb;i = 1 8i 2 N .3 The goal of the social planner
is to minimise the sum of the ranks over agents while remaining within the resource
constraint. Formally, this can be expressed as the following MMKP:
min tr (UX 0) ;
s:t: :B0X1N = 1Q :
(1)
Here 1N and 1Q are the N and Q-length unit vectors respectively. Choosing an
objective function for the MMKP is directly related to the problem of choosing a
social welfare function. Given the rankings, one can select any bijective function
to transform ranks into cardinal values, with the lowest numeral rank producing
the highest utility. Minimising the sum of the ranks is therefore equivalent to a
maximisation of the sum of the utilities, which is a standard Benthamite social
welfare function.4 The constraint ensures that the sum of the binary identiers for
each selected bundle equals the unit vector, i.e. each unit in Q is selected only
once. Expressed in scalar notation, this corresponds to the MMKP as presented by
Hi, Michrafy, and Sbihi (2004); Sbihi (2007). The only dierences compared to the
more general framework in the operational research literature is that the program
uses minimisation rather than maximisation, the resource requirement per bundle
in B is the same for all i agents, and the available capacity is restricted to one for
all dimensions in Q:
min
NP
i=1
2QP
b=1
Ub;iXb;i ;
s:t: :
NP
i=1
2QP
b=1
Bb;jXb;i = 1 8j 2 Q :
 Step 4: Once the optimal choice table X is obtained, the social planner can build a
QN allocation table A = B0X, shown in table (3). This table uniquely assigns
every unit in Q to an agent in N , and can therefore be used for the purpose of
3One can see that even if the agent is allocated two bundles a and b from the B-table 1, then a+ b is
also a bundle in B.
4Any bijective functions is ne, as a utility function is never uniquely dened. Choosing a dierent
function for dierent agents is equivalent to choosing dierent weights for the agents in the linear sum.
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selecting goods one by one and dispatching them to their allocated owner.
Table 3: Allocation table
A i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 ... i = N
j = 1 0 0 1 0 ... 0
j = 2 1 0 0 0 ... 0
j = 3 0 1 0 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ...
j = Q 0 0 0 1 ... 0
There are two main advantages to presenting an allocation problem in this way. The
rst is that it provides a stylised model that neatly separates the types of hurdles facing
an economic planner, starting with the choice of the correct social welfare function, then,
as pointed out by Hayek (1945), the presence of a high and potentially unfeasible informa-
tional requirement (Step 2), followed by a large computationally complex combinatorial
optimisation (Step 3).5 Given these diculties, the second advantage of the thought ex-
periment is the fact that the structure of the MMKP problem and its solution provides a
framework within which the state space, and the ignorance of the location within it, can
be measured and used for analytical purposes. This is examined in the next section.
3 An information-theoretic prediction methodology
In theory all four steps of the MMKP are feasible and A exists. However given that it
is not tractable in practice for the social planner to perform either Step 2 or 3 of this
procedure, the optimal allocation A is unknown. As a rst step, we show that this
ignorance can not only be precisely measured, but also used to obtain a prediction of the
stable distribution of the Q units over the N agents that relies only on the constraint of
the MMKP. In a second step, we then show that whether or not the stable distribution
is linked to the existence of a decentralised equilibrium depends on characteristics of the
objective function of the MMKP only.
5The knapsack problem is known to be NP-complete, in other words solutions to the problem can be
veried eciently (in polynomial time), but there is no known algorithm for calculating the solutions
eciently in the rst place.
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3.1 Information-theoretic constraints to aggregate behaviour
Shannon (1948) shows that the information content of an uncertain message M , where
the message is X characters long and each character can take Y values, is given by:
I (M) = X
YX
y=1
py log py (2)
Here py is the frequency of the y
th character. If one has a frequency distribution fpyg,
equation (2) gives the amount of bits required to code the message, as is done in Shannon
(1948) with the average information content of English text.6 Alternatively, as explained
by Jaynes (1957a,b), if one can obtain the information content I (M) directly, equation
(2) can be used in the opposite direction, in order to predict the frequency distribution
consistent with the information content and the length of the message. The information
content can be derived either from measurement or from theoretical considerations, as
Theil (1967) and Jaynes (1989) show that the information content of a message is simply
the logarithm of its state space.
This has given rise to the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) methodology, which is used
to describe the aggregate behaviour of a system in situations where there is very little
detailed information available. In an economic setting it has been used by Foley (1994)
and Toda (2010) to prove the existence of a statistical market equilibrium when agents
have \oer sets" of transactions they are willing to accept and interact in a random
fashion. In their framework the uncertainty comes from the sequence of transactions,
while in the thought experiment used here the uncertainty is much more fundamental, as
the social planner is unable to even obtain the preference rankings of agents.
The MaxEnt approach can be applied to the allocation table A obtained from the
MMKP, which has a known state space and can be coded eciently into a message with
a measurable information content. This information content then strongly constrains the
observable frequencies of the events. The most ecient way of coding the information in
table A (3) would be to use a Q-length output message, where each entry can take N
6The information unit will be the bit only if log2 is used. The natural logarithm produces an infor-
mation measure in \nats" with 1 nat = log2(e) bit (approximately 1.4427 bit).
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possibilities.
Units: j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5 ... j = Q
Agents: 3 4 1 6 1 ... 5
As the social planner reads each entry, the allocated owner of the unit is given by the
label uniquely identifying each agent. The state space of this message is simply NQ. As
a result, the detailed information content of the allocation table A is given by:
I (A) = Q logN (3)
If the social planner knows that the Q units can be grouped into K types of commodi-
ties, then this full description of the allocation contains redundancy. Let a K-section
of the allocation table Ak be the group of rows in the allocation table (3) that contain
the allocation of the Kth commodity. Because the qk units are undistinguishable, many
bundles in the binary identier table B are for all purposes identical, and any permuta-
tion of the rows within a K-section Ak leads to an identical allocation. This redundant
information can be removed to obtain a more ecient coding of the message. Given qk
units per commodityK, this allows for qk! permutations per givenK-section. Taking logs,
using Stirling's approximation and subtracting from (3) gives the corrected information
measure for Ak:
I (Ak) = qk logN   (qk log qk   qk) ;
I (Ak) = qk

1 + log
N
qk

: (4)
This is the information entropy for a qk length message using an exponential distribu-
tion with mean N=qk. The intuition behind this is that permuting rows in a particular
K-section Ak is equivalent to permuting cells in the output message. Out of all the pos-
sible permutations a particular one of interest is the one where the qk entries are sorted
by ascending agent label:
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Units: j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5 ... j = qk
Agents: 1 1 2 2 2 ... N
Each agent is expected to be selected qk=N times meaning that new agents arrive in the
string at a rateN=qk, thus explaining the exponential form. Furthermore, the permutation
also reveals the information redundancies mentioned above. Sending a message in this
format is clearly inecient, particularly if the number of units to be allocated qk is much
greater than the number of agents N . It would be better to convert the message into an
N -length message where each entry simply indicates the number of units to be allocated
to the ith agent.
Agents: i = 1 i = 2 ... i = N
Units: 2 3 ... 4
Performing this change in variable provides the following information content for the
shorter message. The underlying distribution remains exponential, with a message length
of N and an expected endowment of qk=N . This is in line with the result of Foley (1994)
which shows that the MaxEnt prediction for an exchange economy is an exponential
distribution.
I (Ak) = N

1 + log
qk
N

(5)
This illustrates the information-theoretic interpretation of the MaxEnt approach and
the endowment distribution it predicts. Given a message length of N , should the social
planner predict a distribution of endowments that is not exponential, this would imply an
information measure dierent from (5). This in turn requires the allocated quantities to
be either greater or smaller than qk, both of which violate the MMKP constraint in (1).
Therefore, the only consistent predicted endowment distribution is the one that produces
the same information content as the allocation table (3), subject to known information
redundancies. Any dierence between observed and predicted distributions can then be
used to identify the remaining information redundancies in the structure of the allocation
table A that the social planner was initially unaware of.
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This methodology shows that only a single predicted endowment distribution is consis-
tent with a given information structure for the allocation matrix A. Crucially, however,
all the allocation tables allowed by the MMKP constraint in (1) carry the same information
content. The existence of the stable distribution therefore has no connection to objective
function of the MMKP. We now move to investigating under which conditions the social
planner can be condent that this distribution describes and underlying equilibrium if the
allocation problem is solved in a decentralised but unobserved manner.
3.2 Knapsacks, congestion games and convergence to equilib-
rium
As explained in section 2, the operational research literature has used the MMKP to
model resource allocation on a network. Similar network allocation frameworks also serve
as illustrations of congestion games, for example the road congestion setting presented
by Rosenthal (1973), where road users attempt to select routes so as to minimise the
congestion they experience. A network congestion framework will therefore be used here
to illustrate the conditions under which the two settings are equivalent. The congestion
game that will be examined here uses an N -edge multigraph, corresponding to N routes
between two points, as illustrated by gure 1. This choice of graph implies that distinct
routes follow separate edges, and avoids the interdependence of costs between edges.7
Each edge is assumed to have a controller who can work out the congestion cost for any
given number of users.
There are qk 2 N users for each of theK types, who all need to get from the start point
s to the nish point f .8 In terms of the congestion game, there are N routes/strategies
that can be chosen by each user, and the cost to the user is simply the cost of using the
selected edge.
7In other words, this simple example avoids the presence of externalities between routes, where the
cost of a number of users choosing a route depends on the number of users choosing another route that
shares a common edge.
8Following the road congestion example of Rosenthal (1973), one could imagine that the K types
represent dierent categories of vehicles, such as cars, trucks, etc. who each generate dierent congestion
costs.
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s f
Figure 1: Multigraph congestion game
The dierent sequences of this allocation problem can be set up using the MMKP
thought experiment presented in section 2. The only dierence is that at step 2, the social
planner sends the B-table to the N edge controllers, who each return the congestion cost
that will arise on their edge for all the possible bundles. As a result, a 2Q N cost table
C is obtained.9 This implies that at step 3, the MMKP program uses tr (CX 0) as the
objective function to be minimised.
Two assumptions are required to show the equivalence between the MMKP and con-
gestion game solutions to this framework. In order do so, kCb;i = Cb;i  Cb ;i is dened
as the marginal cost of an extra k-type user, where b  is a bundle obtained by removing
a k-type user from bundle b. Similarly, in the following, b+ refers to a bundle obtained
by adding a k-type user to bundle b.10
Monotonicity: kCb;i > 0 8k; i; b i.e. congestion costs on an edge are increasing
with the number of users.
Global convexity: Given two bundles a and b, 8i; x 2 N if Cb;i > Ca;x then kCb;i >
kCa;x
Monotonically increasing costs are a standard assumption for congestion games. Con-
vexity intuitively means that congestion exhibits increasing marginal values. Furthermore
global convexity implies that removing a k-type user from a heavily congested road brings
a larger reduction in congestion than removing the same user from another less congested
road. As will become apparent in the following proofs, this is needed because the objective
9The dierence with the ranking table U in section 2 is that the null bundle is ranked last and the
full bundle is ranked highest. In the cost table C, assuming monotonicity, the null bundle produces the
lowest cost and the full bundle the highest cost.
10kCb;i is of course undened for the empty bundle.
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function used in the MMKP is not the same as the one used in the basic congestion game
framework of Rosenthal (1973). We now prove that if the cost table C satises these two
assumptions, the MMKP and congestion game formulations are equivalent.
Proposition: If the cost table displays monotonicity and global convexity, the optimal
solution to the MMKP problem is a Nash equilibrium for the corresponding multigraph
congestion game.
Proof: By contradiction. Let X be the decision table that satises the MMKP (1)
and A = B0X the corresponding allocation of the Q users over the N edges of the
multigraph. Let us assume that A is not a Nash equilibrium for the Q users. Then there
exists a k-type user j 2 Q whose cost is reduced by switching from edge i to edge x.
If b and a are the bundles allocated to edges i and x respectively by X, this requires
Cb;i > Ca+;x. Given that the allocated bundles to all the other edges are unchanged, the
change in the objective function of the MMKP is:
Cb ;i   Cb;i + Ca+;x   Ca;x ,  kCb;i +kCa+;x
Global convexity of costs implies that this term is negative. Following the switch in edge
by the jth user the objective function is smaller, therefore contradicting the fact that X
satises the MMKP. 
Corollary: If the cost table displays monotonicity and global convexity, the objective
function of the MMKP is an ordinal potential function for the corresponding multigraph
congestion game.11
Proof: Immediate from the denition of convexity and the previous proof. The change
in cost to a k-type user for switching from edge i to x is Ca+;x  Cb;i. The corresponding
change in the objective function of the MMKP is  kCb;i +kCa+;x. One has:
sgn (Ca+;x   Cb;i) = sgn ( kCb;i +kCa+;x)
11An ordinal potential occurs when the changes in the potential function and the changes in the payos
have the same sign. An exact potential further requires they also have the same value.
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The objective function of the MMKP is an ordinal potential for the corresponding con-
gestion game. 
Monderer and Shapely (1996) show that all ordinal potential game possess the nite
improvement property (FIP), meaning that even a simple a myopic best response path is
enough to lead to the optimal equilibrium in a nite number of steps. Combined with the
proposition shown above, the central implication of this result is that if the preferences
expressed by the N agents/edges are globally convex, then the social planner can be con-
dent that the predictions obtained using the information-theoretic methodology outlined
in section 3.1 will describe the aggregate properties of an underlying optimal outcome.
An important note is that in the U -table (2), preference rankings are monotonically
decreasing with units allocated, while in the C-table costs increase monotonically with
users allocated. The two problems are therefore slightly dierent, but the equivalence
proposition nevertheless carries across. This formally requires transforming the rankings
in the U -table into proxy utility values by applying a concave inverse mapping, hence
changing the rank-minimisation problem into a utility-maximisation. The global con-
vexity requirement for preferences when minimising overall rank thus becomes a global
concavity requirement for utility, which is a standard assumption in economics.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of the thought experiment and the justication for using the MMKP to model
the allocation problem is twofold. First of all, because it provides a clear state-space, it
allows for the use of information theory to obtain the specication for the information
content of the solution, and hence a constraint on predicted distributions at the aggregate
level. The second is that the structure of the MMKP is very similar to that of congestion
games. In fact, the only requirement for the optimal MMKP allocation to also be a
Nash equilibrium and the objective function to be an ordinal potential is the existence of
convexity (or concavity for a maximisation) in the objective function.
As a result, the thought experiment sheds light on the link between rationality and
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aggregate characteristics mentioned in the introduction. As was explained at the begin-
ning of section 3.2, the predictions obtained with the information-theoretic methodology
do not depend on the rationality of agents: all that is required is that the information
content of the message containing the allocation not violate the structure of the allocation
matrix A, which depends only on the MMKP constraint and the known redundancies in
the information structure. This is in line with the ndings presented in the introduction,
particularly Becker (1962), who shows that changes in the budget constraint of agents suf-
ce to generate observable demand curves. However, the equivalence between the MMKP
and congestion games when preferences are convex reveals that if the allocation problem
is solved in a decentralised manner, the distribution predicted by the social planner at
the aggregate level will indeed coincide with optimum state at the decentralised level.
More generally, the knapsack thought experiment rationalises the use of information-
theoretic methods in economics: useful predictions can be made about endowment distri-
butions even in the absence of detailed information on the consistency of agent preferences.
As pointed by Hayek (1945), we are all observers whose knowledge of the state of the econ-
omy is vanishingly small. Even for the case where some data is accessible, it does not
completely describe the state of the economy. In such a context, the MaxEnt methodol-
ogy developed by Jaynes (1957a,b) uses the information-theoretic Shannon entropy as a
measure of the ignorance of an observer. As a result, following this methodology provides
the best prediction of the state of an economy in the absence of all other knowledge.
The use of this methodology, however, goes beyond simple prediction, as it also allows
for successive improvements in the predictions. As stated above, what can the social plan-
ner conclude if empirical frequency data does not conrm her predicted distribution? The
answer to this question is provided by Jaynes (1989): any signicant dierence between
the predicted and empirical information measures represents the amount of information
that can be extracted from the frequency data in order to improve the knowledge of the
information redundancies in the system, hence improving further the prediction, and more
importantly, improving the understanding of the underlying data-generating mechanisms.
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